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Abstract
We study a many-to-many generalisation of the well-known stable roommates problem in which each participant seeks to be
matched with a number of others. We present a linear-time algorithm that determines whether a stable matching exists, and if so,
returns one such matching.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The stable ﬁxtures (SF) problem is a generalisation of the stable roommates (SR) problem (a detailed treatment of
which can be found in [4, Chapter 4]) in which each participant has a ﬁxed capacity, and is to be assigned a number of
matches less than or equal to that capacity subject to the normal stability criterion. The name derives from a possible
application in which a set of players (or teams) take part in a competition in which the ﬁxtures, in the form of a set of
matches between players, are to be speciﬁed in advance. Each player has a speciﬁed target number of matches, and
may play against each of the others at most once. Each ranks a subset of the others—his acceptable opponents—in
order of preference. A set of ﬁxtures is stable if there are no two mutually acceptable players, who do not form a
match, but each of whom either prefers the other to one of his prescribed matches or has fewer matches than his
capacity.
More formally, an instance of the SF problem consists of
• X= {x1, . . . , xn}, the set of players;
• for each i (1 in) a positive integer ci , which we refer to as the capacity of xi ; this is the maximum number of
matches that xi can have;
• a preference structure, denoted by P; this comprises a preference list Pi for each xi (1 in), which is a strictly
ordered subset of X\{xi}.
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If xj appears in Pi we say that xj is acceptable to xi . If xj precedes xk in Pi we say that xi prefers xj to xk . A pair
{xi, xj } is an acceptable pair if xi is acceptable to xj , and xj is acceptable to xi . Only acceptable pairs play a role in
the SF problem, so we may assume, without loss of generality, that if xj is acceptable to xi but xi is not acceptable to
xj , then xj is simply deleted from Pi , and hence that the preference lists are consistent, i.e., xj is in Pi if and only if
xi is in Pj . We denote by |Pi | the number of entries in the list Pi .
A matchingM is a set of acceptable pairs {xi, xj } such that, for all i (1 in),
|{xj : {xi, xj } ∈M}|ci .
The size ofM is the number of pairs inM. The members of the setM(xi) = {xj : {xi, xj } ∈M} are referred to as
the matches of xi inM.
An acceptable pair {xi, xj } /∈M is a blocking pair for matchingM, or blocksM, if
• either xi has fewer than ci matches or prefers xj to at least one of his matches inM; and
• either xj has fewer than cj matches or prefers xi to at least one of his matches inM.
A matching for which there is no blocking pair is said to be stable, and is otherwise unstable.
The case in which ci = 1 for all i is the well-known SR problem. SR was introduced by Gale and Shapley [2] in their
classical paper on the stable marriage (SM) problem. They showed that, in contrast to the case of SM, an instance of
SR may or may not admit a stable matching. Subsequently, the possibility of a polynomial-time algorithm to solve SR
was presented as an open problem by Knuth [8]. This question was resolved by Irving [5], who gave a polynomial-time
algorithm to determine whether a stable matching exists, and if so to ﬁnd one suchmatching. Further algorithmic results
for SR were established by Gusﬁeld [3], and these various results were collated and extended in [4].
In fact, in the classical version of SR, n is even and all preference lists are complete, i.e., xj ∈ Pi for all i, j, i = j ,
so that if a stable matching does exist then every player is matched to exactly one other. So in this context, a matching
is a perfect matching. If n is odd and/or preference lists may be incomplete, then a stable matching, if one exists, may
or may not be perfect [4]. However, if a stable matching does exist, then every stable matching involves the same set
of players, and as a consequence, all stable matchings have the same size [4].
By contrast, in the SF problem, it is easy to construct an example to show that, even if all preference lists are complete,
a stable matching may have some players with fewer matches than their capacity. For example, consider an instance
involving four players, each of capacity 2, in which one particular player is ranked last by each of the others. It is easy
to see that the sole stable matching here has size 3, and the unpopular player has no matches. So, at least in this respect,
SF behaves somewhat differently from SR.
The SR problem is a generalisation of the SM problem, in the sense that, for any instance of SM there is an instance
of SR involving the same players for which exactly the same matchings are stable [4]. The many-to-one generalisation
of SM, the so-called Hospital-Residents (HR) problem, together with its important practical applications, has been
extensively studied—see, for example, [4,11]. Recently Baı¨ou and Balinski [1] have shown that the many-to-many
extension of SM can be solved in O(n2) time, where n is the size of the larger set. The SF problem is simultaneously a
generalisation of all of these others, and therefore has considerable theoretical interest as ostensibly the most general
of all stable matching problems.
Here we present an extension of Irving’s SR algorithm which, for a given instance of the SF problem, determines
if a stable matching exists, and if so ﬁnds one such matching, all in O(m) time, where m is the sum of the lengths
of the preference lists. As in the SR case, the SF algorithm is split into two phases, discussed in Sections 2 and 3,
respectively. In Section 4 we consider the implementation and complexity of the algorithm, and in Section 5 we present
our conclusion and some open problems.
2. Phase 1 of the algorithm
The ﬁrst phase of the algorithm closely resembles the ﬁrst phase of the SR algorithm [5], in that, conceptually, it
involves a sequence of bids from one player for another (usually referred to as ‘proposals’ in the SM context). These
bids enable the construction of a set S of potential matched pairs, and also allow the identiﬁcation of some pairs that
cannot belong to any stable matching, and which are therefore deleted from the preference structure. By the deletion of
a pair {xi, xj }, we mean the removal of xi from Pj and of xj from Pi . Henceforth we denote by P the current preference
2120 R.W. Irving, S. Scott / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 2118–2129
Fig. 1. Algorithm SF-Phase1.
structure, noting that this changes during the algorithm as a result of deletions. We say that {xi, xj } is in P if xi is in Pj
(or, equivalently, xj is in Pi since preference structures are always consistent.)
The set S consists of ordered pairs (xi, xj ), and is initially empty. For each player xi we deﬁne two sets Ai and Bi
as follows:
Ai = {xj : (xi, xj ) ∈ S},
Bi = {xj : (xj , xi) ∈ S}.
In terms of bids, Ai represents the set of players for whom xi has made a bid that has not (yet) been rejected, while Bi
represents the set of players who have bid for him and whom he has not rejected. If xj ∈ Ai (or equivalently, xi ∈ Bj )
at some point during the algorithm’s execution, then we say that xj is, at that moment, a target for xi and xi is a bidder
for xj . We denote |Ai | and |Bi | by ai and bi , respectively, so ai is the current number of targets of xi , and bi the current
number of bidders for xi .
Each successive bid is made by some player xi who has fewer targets than his capacity; xi will bid for the ﬁrst player
xj in Pi who is not already among his targets, and as a result (xi, xj ) is added to S and xj becomes a target of xi . If it
is still the case that bj < cj , i.e., xj has fewer bidders than his capacity, then no further action results. However, if (i)
bj = cj or (ii) bj = cj + 1, the only other possibilities, then in the ranking of xj ’s bidders induced by Pj , the bidder
ranked in position cj , say xk , is identiﬁed, and all the pairs {xl, xj }, such that xj prefers xk to xl , are deleted. These
deletions might include one pair in S, namely in case (ii) above, and if so this pair is deleted from S—it represents the
rejection of xl’s bid by xj for the xl in question—and as a result, xl is no longer a bidder for xj and xj is no longer a
target for xl . An immediate invariant is that, for each i, the set Ai consists of the ﬁrst ai players in Pi . This phase of the
algorithm terminates when, for all i, ai = min(ci, |Pi |).
The algorithm, which we refer to as Algorithm SF-Phase1, is displayed in Fig. 1.
Algorithm SF-Phase1 is non-deterministic but, as with other proposal-based algorithms for solving variants of the
SM problem, this non-determinism has no effect on the outcome. We shall call the preference structure resulting from
the execution of phase 1 the phase 1 preference structure, denoted by P 1. For a given player xi , we denote xi’s list in
P 1 by P 1i . We also denote by S1, A
1
i and B
1
i the sets S, Ai and Bi , and a
1
i , b
1
i the values of ai , bi , respectively, for each
i, on termination of SF-Phase1.
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions from the outcome of Algorithm SF-Phase1. To this end, we
deﬁne the terms stable pair to be a pair {xi, xj } that belongs to some stable matching, and stable match of a player xi
to be a player xj such that {xi, xj } is a stable pair.
Lemma 2.1. If {xi, xj } is not in P 1 then {xi, xj } is not a stable pair.
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Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that {xi, xj } is a stable pair that is not in P 1. Let M be a stable matching
containing the pair {xi, xj }, and suppose that {xi, xj } was the ﬁrst stable pair to be deleted during a particular execution
E of SF-Phase1. Suppose further, without loss of generality, that the deletion of {xi, xj } took place when some
player xk bid for xi . Then xi must at that point have had ci − 1 existing bidders whom he preferred to xj , say
xi1 , . . . , xici−1 , and he must also prefer xk to xj . Let U be the set {xi1 , . . . , xici−1 , xk}. Not all of the players in U can
be matches of xi inM, for xj /∈U is one such match. So choose xl ∈ U such that {xi, xl} /∈M. Suppose xl prefers
all of his matches in M to xi . Then for xi to have become a target of xl during E, some stable pair (involving xl)
must already have been deleted, contradicting the assumption that {xi, xj } was the ﬁrst such deletion. It follows that
xl prefers xi to at least one of his matches inM, and we know that xi prefers xl to xj , a contradiction of the stability
ofM. 
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2.1. Any player xi for whom |P 1i | = 0 has no stable matches.
Some further lemmas record various properties of stable matchings, should any exist.
Lemma 2.2. If (xi, xj ) ∈ S1 and (xj , xi) ∈ S1 then {xi, xj } is in every stable matching.
Proof. Suppose that (xi, xj ) ∈ S1 and (xj , xi) ∈ S1, and thatM is a stable matching such that {xi, xj } /∈M. The fact
that (xi, xj ) ∈ S1 implies that xj is among the ﬁrst ci entries in P 1i , and likewise (xj , xi) ∈ S1 implies that xi is among
the ﬁrst cj entries in P 1j . By Lemma 2.1, xj cannot have a match inM who is not in P
1
i , so either he has fewer than
ci matches, or has a match to whom he prefers xj . A similar observation applies to xj , and it follows that {xi, xj } is a
blocking pair forM—a contradiction. 
Lemma 2.3. For all i (1 in), a1i = min(ci, |P 1i |) = b1i .
Proof. Bydeﬁnition,ai=min(ci, |P 1i |) for all i is the termination conditionofSF-Phase1. It is clear that
∑
a1i =
∑
b1i ,
since each pair in S1 contributes exactly one to each of these sums. If, for some k, a1k = b1k then either a1k < b1k or
a1k > b
1
k . In the former case, we let index i be k. In the latter case, because of the equal sums, there must be some t = k
such that a1t < b1t , and in that case we let index i be t. So we can assume, without loss of generality, that a1i < b
1
i . It
follows from the algorithm that b1i ci , since whenever bi becomes greater than ci , xi rejects one of his bidders. Hence
a1i < ci , so that a
1
i = |P 1i |. For each xj ∈ B1i , by deﬁnition we have (xj , xi) ∈ S1, and so xi ∈ P 1j , and xj ∈ P 1i by
consistency. It follows that b1i = |B1i | |P 1i | = a1i , a contradiction. 
Lemma 2.4. Let xi be a player for whom |P 1i |ci . Then in every stable matching, the matches of xi are precisely the
players xj in P 1i .
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, no player who is not in P 1i can be a stable match of xi . Also, for every xj in P
1
i , we must have
(xi, xj ) ∈ S1, otherwise a1i = min(ci, |P 1i |), and the termination condition for SF-Phase1 is not satisﬁed. Since
a1i = b1i , by Lemma 2.3, and since the only candidates for the set B1i are the ai entries on P 1i , it follows that all of these
entries are in B1i , and therefore (xj , xi) ∈ S1 for all xj in P 1i . The result follows from Lemma 2.2. 
Lemma 2.5. Any player xi for whom |P 1i |ci must have exactly ci matches in any stable matching.
Proof. It must be the case that a1i = ci , otherwise the termination condition a1i =min(ci, |P 1i |) would not be satisﬁed,
and therefore, by Lemma 2.3, b1i = ci also.
Suppose that B1i = {xi1 , . . . , xici }. Then for each j (1jci) xi appears in the ﬁrst cij positions in P 1ij . If, in a
matchingM, xi has fewer than ci matches then, in particular, one of xi1 , . . . , xici , say xik , is not a match. So {xi, xik }
blocksM, a contradiction. 
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Fig. 2. The outcome of SF-Phase1 for an example instance.
We denote min(ci, |P 1i |) by di , and refer to this as the degree of player i. Note that the degree of a player is a property
of the problem instance; it does not change its value in the course of the algorithm.
Theorem 2.1. (i) The number of matches for a given player xi is the same in all stable matchings, namely di .
(ii) All stable matchings for a given instance of the SF problem have the same size.
Proof. (i) This follows at once from Corollary 2.1 and Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5.
(ii) This is an immediate consequence of part (i). 
Corollary 2.2. For a given instance of the SF problem, if∑ di is odd, then there is no stable matching.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1 (i), this sum is double the size of a stable matching, since it counts every matched pair exactly
twice. 
Example. The original and phase 1 preference structures for an example instance are displayed in Fig. 2, together with
the set S1. Player xi’s preference list is represented in the form xi : (ci) Pi .
It may be veriﬁed that
∑
di = 14, so that Corollary 2.2 does not apply in this case. We can conclude that,
if a stable matching exists, then it must have size 7. We can make the following additional observations
from P 1:
• player x10 has an empty list and must therefore be unmatched in every stable matching;
• players x6 and x7 have only each other on their lists and so are matched only with each other in every stable
matching;
• player x6, who has a capacity of 2, cannot attain that capacity in any stable matching;
• by Lemma 2.2, players x1 and x2 must be matched in every stable matching.
Of course, we do not yet know whether a stable matching exists for this instance—we shall see later that at least one
such matching does exist.
For what follows, we need one further result concerning the outcome of SF-Phase1.
Lemma 2.6. If di < ci , dj < cj and {xi, xj } is not in P 1, then {xi, xj } cannot be an acceptable pair.
Proof. Let us assume that di < ci , dj < cj , and (xi, xj ) is not in P 1. Then if {xi, xj } is an acceptable pair, it must have
been deleted during the execution of SF-Phase1, say when some player xk became a bidder for xi . At that point, xi
must have had ci bidders. Subsequently, xi can lose a bidder only on gaining another one, so he can never again have
fewer than ci bidders. Hence |S1i |ci , so that di = min(ci, |S1i |) = ci , a contradiction. 
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3. Phase 2 of the algorithm
Our starting point for phase 2 of the algorithm is the set S1 and preference structure P 1 constructed by phase 1. The
essence of phase 2 is the further development of the set S of potential matched pairs, and the further reduction of the
preference structure P. Ultimately, we may ﬁnd that one of the preference lists, say Pi , has its length reduced below the
degree di of xi , which is a signal that no stable matching exists. Otherwise, the set S eventually becomes symmetric,
i.e., (xi, xj ) ∈ S ⇔ (xj , xi) ∈ S, in which case the pairs in S constitute a stable matching.
We use the symbol P to represent the (changing) preference structure, starting with P = P 1. For phase 2, the set
S = S(P ) is deﬁned in terms of P as follows:
S(P ) = {(xi, xj ) : xj is in the ﬁrst di positions in Pi}.
We call a preference list Pi in P short if |Pi |<di , and long if |Pi |>di . (Note that in case |P 1i | = di it follows that
|P 1i |ci , and this is covered by Lemma 2.4.)
The sets Ai and Bi , with sizes ai and bi , respectively, are deﬁned as before, namely
Ai = {xj : (xi, xj ) ∈ S(P )},
Bi = {xj : (xj , xi) ∈ S(P )}.
Note that Ai and Bi depend on S, which in turn depends on P, but we suppress this dependence in the notation for
brevity. We continue to refer to Ai as the set of targets for xi , and Bi as the set of bidders for xi . The set Ai consists of
the ﬁrst di players in the list Pi .
In addition, we denote by xl(i) the last player in Pi , and by xf (i) the ﬁrst player, if any, in Pi who is not in Ai , in
other words, the player in position di + 1 in Pi . The player xf (i) is deﬁned only for players xi with a long preference
list. For obvious reasons, we refer to xl(i) as the worst bidder for xi , and xf (i) as the next target for xi .
Throughout phase 2, the preference structure P and its associated set S(P ) have certain crucial properties, which are
encapsulated in the following deﬁnition.
A preference structure P is called stable if
SPS1: for all i (1 in), ai = bi(=di);
SPS2: for all i (1 in) such that Pi is non-empty, xl(i) ∈ Bi ;
SPS3: an acceptable pair {xi, xj } is not in P if and only if xi prefers xl(i) to xj or xj prefers xl(j) to xi .
The following lemma shows that phase 2 of the algorithm begins with a stable preference structure.
Lemma 3.1. The phase 1 preference structure P 1, with its associated set S1, is a stable preference structure.
Proof. Property SPS1 is immediate from Lemma 2.3. If di = |P 1i |, then property SPS2 follows from the fact that all of
the players in P 1i are in Bi , and otherwise from the fact that all successors in P
1
i of the least preferred member of B
1
i
are explicitly deleted during SF-Phase1. Finally, Property SPS3 is a consequence of the fact that a pair {xi, xj } is
deleted during SF-Phase1 only if xi prefers his current ci th choice bidder to xj or xj prefers his current cj th choice
bidder to xi , and in either case, the bidder in question becomes the last entry in the preference list. 
The next lemma characterises the preference structure on termination of phase 2 in the case where a stable matching
exists.
Lemma 3.2. Let P be a stable preference structure in which, for all i (1 in), |Pi | = di . Then the set S = S(P ) is
symmetric, i.e., (xi, xj ) ∈ S ⇔ (xj , xi) ∈ S; furthermore, the set of unordered pairs represented by S forms a stable
matching.
Proof. Suppose that (xi, xj ) ∈ S. This implies that xj ∈ Pi , and by the consistency of P, that xi ∈ Pj . The fact that
|Pj | = dj , together with property SPS1, implies that all of the players in Pj are in Aj , and so in particular pi ∈ Aj ,
hence (pj , pi) ∈ S.
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Deﬁne the matching M = {{xk, xl} : (xk, xl) ∈ S}. Let {xi, xj } be an acceptable pair that is not in P. Then, by
property SPS3, either xi prefers xl(i) to xj or xj prefers xl(j) to xi . It follows that xi prefers all of his matches inM
to xj , or xj prefers all of his matches in M to xi . So the only way that {xi, xj } can block M is if each has fewer
matches than his capacity. Since, by Theorem 2.1(i), xi and xj have di and dj matches, respectively, inM, this implies
that di < ci and dj < cj . Hence, by deﬁnition, di = |P 1i | and dj = |P j1 |, so the acceptable pair {xi, yj } must have been
deleted by Algorithm SF-Phase1, and so is not in P 1, in contradiction of Lemma 2.6. 
The key to the further reduction of the preference structure is the concept of a rotation, similar to that introduced by
Irving [5] for the SR algorithm. Relative to a preference structure P, a rotation is a sequence of ordered pairs
= ((xi0 , xj0), (xi1 , xj1), . . . , (xir−1 , xjr−1)),
where, for each k (0kr − 1),
xik = xl(jk) and xjk+1 = xf (ik),
with k + 1 evaluated modulo r. So xik is xjk ’s worst bidder, and xjk+1 is xik ’s next target. For each k, we say that xik ,
xjk and the pair (xik , xjk ) are in the rotation .
Example. In the example illustrated in Fig. 2, it may be veriﬁed that, for the preference structure P 1,  = ((x4, x3),
(x3, x9), (x5, x1), (x2, x4)) is a rotation, in fact, as it turns out, the only rotation.
The intuition underlying the concept of a rotation is as follows. If  = ((xi0 , xj0), . . . , (xir−1 , xjr−1)) is a rotation,
then suppose that, for some k (0kr − 1), xik ’s bid for xjk were to be rejected. Then xik would bid for xjk+1 , causing
xik+1 ’s bid for xjk+1 to be rejected. Hence rejections and new bids would follow all the way round the cycle. For each
k, we refer to xik as the new bidder for xjk+1 .
Lemma 3.3. Let P be a stable preference structure in which some player xi has a long preference list. Then there is
at least one rotation in P.
Proof. We denote by V (P ) the set of players with long preference lists, i.e., the players xi for whom |Pi |>di . For a
player xi ∈ V (P ), let xj = xl(i), so that (xi, xj ) /∈ S. Player xj is also in V (P ), for (xi, xj ) /∈ S implies that there is
some k such that (xj , xk) /∈ S, otherwise it could not be the case that aj =bj , and this is all that is required to ensure that
xj ∈ V (P ). Hence such an xk is deﬁned, and by the same argument, xk ∈ V (P ). Since such an xk exists, xf (j)=xf (l(i))
exists, and we will assume for the rest of the proof thatxk = xf (j).
Let D(P ) be a directed graph with a node for each player xi in V (P ). For each node xi in D(P ), let there be an
outgoing edge to the node xf (l(i)), which, as we have seen, is well deﬁned and in V (P ). Because every node in D(P )
has out-degree 1,D(P ) must contain at least one cycle. Suppose that the nodes in such a cycle are xj0 , . . . , xjr−1 in that
order.Then, since xjk+1=xf (l(jk)) for 0 ir−1, k+1 takenmodulo r, it follows that=((xi0 , xj0), . . . , (xir−1 , xjr−1)),
is a rotation in P, where xik = xl(jk) for all k. 
The proof of Lemma 3.3 provides a means of ﬁnding a rotation in a stable preference structure P: starting from any
player xi who has a long preference list, traverse the unique path in D(P ) from the node xi until some node is visited
twice. If  is the rotation generated by this traversal, we say that xi leads to  in P. If xi leads to  in P, but the node
xi is not itself in the cycle, then the path in D(P ) from the node xi to the ﬁrst node in the cycle is called a tail of the
rotation. For  = (xi0 , xj0), . . . (xir−1 , xjr−1), we refer to {xi0 , . . . , xir−1} as the bidder set and {xj0 , . . . , xjr−1} as the
target set of . It is easily veriﬁed that xik = xil and xjk = xjl whenever k = l (but the bidder set and target set need
not be disjoint, as in our example, where players x3 and x4 are in both sets).
If  = ((xi0 , xj0), . . . , (xir−1 , xjr−1)) is a rotation in a stable preference structure P, and xjk is a player in the target
set of , we denote by xg(jk) the least favoured member of the set (Bjk ∪ {xik−1})\{xik }, and refer to xg(jk) as xjk ’s
next-worst bidder.
We denote by P/ the preference structure obtained from P by deleting, for 0kr − 1, all pairs {xjk , xl} such
that xjk prefers his next-worst bidder xg(jk) to xl . One consequence is that xi’s worst bidder is removed from his list,
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Fig. 3. The effect of rotation elimination.
Fig. 4. Algorithm SF-Phase2.
and his next-worst bidder becomes his worst bidder as a result. The process of replacing P by P/ is referred to as
eliminating rotation . 
Example. For the example instance illustrated in Fig. 2, the effect of eliminating the rotation  = ((x4, x3), (x3, x9),
(x5, x1), (x2, x4)) is shown in Fig. 3.
Note that there have been deletions from the preference lists of all of the players involved in the rotation.
In phase 2 of the algorithm the preference structure is reduced by successive elimination of rotations. The starting
point is the phase 1 preference structure P 1, which we know is stable. Throughout the reduction, provided no player’s
preference list becomes short (i.e., contains fewer entries than his degree), the current preference structure will be
shown to be stable, so that Lemma 3.3 applies throughout, and the reduction process can continue as long as some
player has a long preference list. We will also show that, if a stable matching does exist for the instance, then there is
always at least one such matching embedded in each of the stable preference structures that is generated.
Phase 2 of the algorithm is summarised in Fig. 4.
Lemma 3.4. Let  be a rotation in a stable preference structure P. Then, if P/ contains no short list, P/ is itself a
stable preference structure.
Proof. If P ′ = P/ contains no short list we need to show that the required three properties are satisﬁed by P ′. For
brevity, we denote the sets associated with S(P ′) by A′i and B ′i , of sizes a′i and b′i , respectively.
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Property SPS1. By deﬁnition, a′i = di , since P ′i is not a short list. It remains to show that b′i = di . As observed
earlier, pairs deleted from P on eliminating  are of the form {xl, xj }, where xj is in the target set of  and xj prefers
his next-worst bidder to xl . This applies to only one pair of S(P ), namely {xl(j), xj }. Hence xl(j) is the only element
of Bj that is not in B ′j . However, if xi is xj ’s new bidder, then xi is in B ′j but not in Bj , and xi is the only player with
this property. Hence b′j = bj = dj as required.
Property SPS2. Because of the deletions speciﬁed when  is eliminated, the last entry in P ′i is either the same
as in Pi or, if xi is in the target set of , it is his next-worst bidder. This player is in B ′i , so the required property
holds.
Property SPS3. Let {xi, xj } be an acceptable pair that is not in P ′. If {xi, xj } is not even in P then the result is
immediate. Otherwise {xi, xj } must have been deleted because, say, xi prefers his next-worst bidder to xj . But this
is his worst bidder in P ′, so the required property follows. Conversely, the only acceptable pairs deleted when  is
eliminated are precisely pairs for which the required condition is satisﬁed. 
We are now in a position to prove the ﬁnal lemma required to establish the correctness of algorithm SF-Phase2.
Lemma 3.5. If there is a stable matching contained within a stable preference structure P, and if  is a rotation in P,
then there is a stable matching contained within P/.
Proof. LetM be a stable matching contained within P, and suppose that =((xi0 , xj0), . . . , (xir−1 , xjr−1)) is a rotation
in P.
Case (i): for some k (0kr − 1), {xik , xjk } /∈M. We can assume, without loss of generality, that {xi0 , xj0} /∈M.
Suppose that {xj1 , xl} ∈ M for some xl such that xj1 prefers his next-worst bidder to xl . Since {xi0 , xj0} /∈M, since xj0
is a target of xi0 , and since xi0 has exactly di0 stable matches inM, by Lemma 2.5 and the fact that Pi0 is a long list,
we must have {xi0 , xk} ∈M for some xk who is not a target of xi0 .
Subcase (ia): {xi0 , xj1} ∈M. Since there are two non-bidders, xl and xi0 , who are matched with xj1 inM, there must
be some bidder other than xi1 , say xm, who is not matched with xj1 inM. So xj1 prefers xm to xl , one of his matches
inM, and, since xm must have dm matches inM, he prefers xj1 , one of his targets, to one of those matches. Hence
{xj1 , xm} blocksM.
Subcase (ib): {xi0 , xj1} /∈M and {xi0 , xk} ∈ M for some xk lower in xi0 ’s list than xj1 . Then xi0 prefers xj1 to one
of his matches inM, and prefers xi0 , one of his targets, to xl , one of his matches inM. Hence {xi0 , xj1} blocksM.
So all entries in Pj1 worse than xj1 ’s next-worst bidder can be deleted without deleting any pairs ofM. In so doing,
{xi1 , xj1} is deleted, so this pair is not inM, and the same argument can be repeated (r − 1 times) to show that  can
be eliminated without deleting any pairs ofM. ThusM is contained in P/.
Case (ii): for all k (0 ir − 1), {xik , xjk } ∈M. We show that ifM′ is obtained fromM by replacing {xik , xjk } by
{xik , xjk+1} for all k (k + 1 taken modulo r), thenM′ is also a stable matching.
Firstly,M′ is a matching, since each player has the same number of matches inM′ as inM.
Secondly, we have to show thatM′ is contained in P/. None of these new pairs {xik , xjk+1} is deleted when  is
eliminated. Suppose that some other pair inM is deleted. The only pairs deleted are of the form {xjk , xl}, where xjk
prefers his next-worst bidder to xl . If {xjk , xl} ∈ M for such an xl , then xl cannot be a bidder for xjk . Hence some
bidder for xjk other than xik , say xr , is not matched inM with xjk , since both the number of bidders and the number of
matches must be equal to the degree djk . It follows that xjk prefers xr to at least one of his matches inM. Also, xjk is
among the ﬁrst dr entries in xr ’s list in P, so xr prefers xjk to one of his matches inM (which must number dr ). Hence
{xjk , xr} is a blocking pair forM, a contradiction.
Finally, we have to show thatM′ is stable. If there is a blocking pair forM′ then one or both members of the pair
must have a match inM′ who is less desirable than his worst match inM, otherwise the pair blocksM also. The only
players for whom this is the case are those in the bidder set of , so suppose that the blocking pair is {xik , xm} for some
k and m. Furthermore, for xik to have a match inM′ that is worse than any of his matches inM, it must be the case
that xik is matched in M with all of his targets in P, and that xik prefers xm to his next target xjk+1 , but not to any of his
existing targets. Player xm cannot be xjk , because xjk prefers all the players in his preference list in P/, and hence all
his matches inM, to xik . The remaining possibility is that xm lies in xik ’s preference list between his last target in P
and xjk+1 . But then the pair {xik , xm} is not in P, and by property SPS3, this can only be because xm prefers xl(m), and
therefore all of his matches inM′, to xik . 
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Fig. 5. Elimination of a further rotation to give a stable matching.
Fig. 6. An SF instance for which no stable matching exists.
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm SF-Phase2 correctly identiﬁes whether a stable matching exists for an SF instance, and
returns such a matching when one does exist.
Proof. Corollary 2.2 establishes that no stable matching can exist if
∑
di is odd. Otherwise, Lemmas 3.3–3.5 justify
the successive elimination of rotations. Lemma 3.5 shows that, if a short list occurs, then there cannot be a stable
matching, whereas if there is a stable matching then one such matching is returned by the algorithm. 
As with the classical SR problem [5], in cases where more than one stable matching exists, the particular stable
matching returned by SF-Phase2 for an instance of SF depends on the set of rotations eliminated.
Example. Recall that Fig. 3 shows the preference structure after the elimination of one rotation for our example SF
instance. Fig. 5 displays this structure P again. There is only one rotation in P, namely ′ =((x5, x2), (x4, x9), (x3, x8)).
When this rotation is eliminated we obtain the new stable preference structure P/′, shown on the right in Fig. 5, which
is a stable matching.
Example. As a second example, this time one for which no stable matching exists, consider the preference structure
P shown in Fig. 6. In this case SF-Phase1 results in no deletions from the structure. In SF-Phase2, there are
two rotations in P, namely 1 = ((x1, x3), (x2, x1), (x3, x2)) and 2 = ((x4, x6), (x5, x4), (x6, x5)). Elimination of 1
results in short lists for x1, x2 and x3, so there can be no stable matching. (Of course a similar conclusion follows if we
eliminate 2 instead, as this yields short lists for x4, x5 and x6.)
4. Implementation and analysis
We now show that the SF algorithm can be implemented in such a way as to have O(m) worst-case complexity for
an instance involving preference lists with total combined length m.
In phase 1 of the algorithm, deletion of a pair {xi, xj } can be achieved in constant time by holding a separate
ranking array for each player such that, in the array for xi , position j holds the index of the position that xj occupies
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in Pi . This means that, when player xj is deleted from the list of player xi , xi can be deleted from xj ’s list using
one look-up of the ranking array. This second part of the deletion is achieved in constant time if the preference lists
are stored in an indexed, doubly linked structure. The number of deletions is bounded by m, the total length of the
preference lists, as is the number of bids. At the point at which a player xi receives a bid for the ci th time it is simple
to ascertain which element in Pi represents the least favoured of his ci bidders. Thereafter, when a player xi receives
a further bid, the ci th ranked of all of his bidders can be found by stepping backwards in Pi from the last entry to
the next bidder found. The total number of such backward steps is bounded by m, so phase 1 certainly has worst-case
complexity O(m).
For phase 2 of the algorithm a stack is used to house a path traced out in the directed graph D(P ). When a node is
reached that is already on the stack, a rotation has been found and it may be recovered by popping the stack as far as the
ﬁrst occurrence of that node. The rotation may then be eliminated by deleting the necessary pairs, and each deletion is
a constant time operation, as has been noted above. Each successive rotation search begins from the end of the previous
tail, so each pair encountered is a new pair. This ensures that the same, potentially long, tail will not be traversed more
than once. Since the stack must be empty at the end of the execution of the algorithm (it only ever contains players
who have long lists) the number of push and pop operations is the same. Further, at least one pair is deleted every time
a pop operation is performed, so the number of pop (and hence push) operations cannot exceed m, and since every
operation associated with ﬁnding a rotation and deleting a pair can be achieved in constant time, it follows that the
whole algorithm is O(m).
Finally, since the SM problem is a special case of the SF problem, and since there is an (m) lower bound for SM
[9], the SF algorithm is asymptotically optimal.
5. Conclusion and open questions
In this paper we have introduced the SF problem, and described our motivation for studying it. We have established
that there is an O(m) algorithm for determining if an instance of SF admits a stable matching, and if it does, to ﬁnd
one such matching. However, a number of open questions remain, including the following.
Open question 1. For an instance of SF in which the preference lists are complete, what is the smallest possible size
of a stable matching (expressed in terms of the size of the instance, n, and the capacities)?
Open question 2. Is there any analogue of the “medians” result for the SR problem, namely that the so-called median
of any 3 stable matchings is itself a stable matching [4]?
Open question 3. In an instance of SF in which players are allowed to express indifference between two or more
other players, there are a number of possibilities for deﬁning a blocking pair, leading to the notions of weak stability,
strong stability and super-stability [6,7]. For weak stability SF is NP-complete, as a consequence of the corresponding
result for SR [10]. For super-stability, Scott [12] has described a polynomial-time algorithm that builds on the algorithm
presented in this paper. It is open as to whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve SF in the case of
strong stability.
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